Welcome to
( ÇÖÇÁÉ ) ÇáÑÆíÓ ãÍãæÏ ÚÈÇÓ
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ed9bmlIXsAEiHj4?format=jpg&name=900x900



ãáÝÇÊ ÎÇÕÉ


ÇááæÇÁ Ñßä / ÚÑÇÈí ßáæÈ ( ãÔÇÚá Úáì ÇáØÑíÞ )



ÇÔÑÇÞÉ ÇáÕÈÇÍ



https://images.alwatanvoice.com/writers/large/9999469051.jpg


ÍÊí äáÊÞí ( íßÊíåÇ ÑÆíÓ ÇáÊÍÑíÑ )
Serri Alqudwa


ÇáÞÇÆãÉ ÇáÑÆíÓíÉ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



ãä íÊÕÝÍ ÇáÃä
, 494 / 0 / .

.


ÇÔÑÇÞÉ ÇáÕÈÇÍ

ÇáÕÈÇÍ ÇáÑíÇÖí
[ ÇáÕÈÇÍ ÇáÑíÇÖí ]

·ÈÑÔáæäÉ íÊæÌ ÈØáÇð ááÏæÑí ÇáÇÓÈÇäí áßÑÉ ÇáÞÏã.
·ÑíÇÖíæ ÛÒÉ íÊÕÏÑæä ÓÈÇÞ ÇáãÓÇÝÇÊ ÇáØæíáÉ
·ßáÇÓíßæ ÇáÃÑÖ íÈÊÓã áÈÑÔáæäÉ ÈåÏÝ ÓæÇÑíÒ
·ãäÊÎÈäÇ ÇáæØäí íÍÊá ÇáãÑßÒ ÇáÜ126 Ýí ÊÕäíÝ ÇáÝíÝÇ
·äåÑ ÇáÍíÇÉ ...!
·ÃáãÇäíÇ ÊÊÎØì ÇáÌÒÇÆÑ ÈÕÚæÈÉ æÊÖÑÈ ãæÚÏÇ ãÚ ÝÑäÓÇ
·ÇáãÈÏÚ äÚãÇä íÞæÏ ãäÊÎÈäÇ ÇáæØäí áÃæá áÞÈ ÞÇÑí æÈáæÛ Ããã ÂÓíÇ
·ÇáÇÊÍÇÏ ÇáÝáÓØíäí ááÓÈÇÍÉ íÓÊÞÈá ÇáãÏÑÈ æáíã ãÇÑÏæÎ
·ãÝæÖíÉ ßÔÇÝÉ æãÑÔÏÇÊ ÇÑíÍÇ æÇáÃÚæÇÑ ÊäÇÞÔ ÝÚÇáíÇÊ ÇÓÈæÚ ÇáÔÈÇÈ


ÇáåÑæÈ ãä ÓÌä ÇáÑãáÉ ÑæÇíÉ ÍÞíÞíÉ
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/38/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A9_%D8%A5%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85_%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3.jpg


ãÞÇáÇÊ ÑÆíÓ ÇáÊÍÑíÑ
http://www.alsbah.net/archive/file/palestin.jpg

ÍÊì äáÊÞí

1995 - 2005

ÐÇßÑÉ æØä

ÓÑí ÇáÞÏæÉ




Úáí ÇáÏÑÈ ãÇÖæä






ãÔÇÛÈÇÊ : íæãíÇ ÚÈÑ ÇáÕÈÇÍ
http://hosh.ps/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ar-logo5.png







ÇáÈÍË Ýí ÌãíÚ ÇáãæÇÖíÚ


  
ãÊÇÈÚÇÊ: ÌæáÉ ÇáÕÍÇÝÉ ÇáÚÇáãíÉ æ ÇáÛÑÈíÉ : ÊÑÌãÉ : åÇáÉ ÃÈæ Óáíã
01 2015 : ãÊÇÈÚÇÊ ÅÚáÇãíÉ

https://scontent-mad1-1.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-xlp1/v/t1.0-9/12247178_10156282329365343_7243832248138761703_n.jpg?oh=154901f43c159972b64ac623fb496684&oe=56B46B71
ÌæáÉ ÇáÕÍÇÝÉ ÇáÚÇáãíÉ æ ÇáÛÑÈíÉ : ÊÑÌãÉ : åÇáÉ ÃÈæ Óáíã

Çáíæã 1-12-2015
(ÇáÊÍáíáÇÊ ÇáÓíÇÓíÉ ááÕÍÝ ÇáÃÌäÈíÉ )
ÕÍíÝÉ ÇáÛÇÑÏíÇä ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ:
ÕÍíÝÉ ÇáÛÇÑÏíÇä ÊäÊÞÏ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ .... ÇáÚÞÇÈ ÇáÞÇÓí æÇáÚäíÝ áä íÌáÈ ÇáÃãä !!
ãÍÑÑíä .
áÇíæÌÏ ÏæáÉ ÃÎÑí Ýí ÇáÚÇáã Êäæí Ãä ÊõÍÖÑ äÝÓåÇ áÞØÚ ÑÃÓ ÅäÓÇä ÔÇÈ ¡æÅáÞÇÁ ÈÞÇíÇå ÃãÇã Çáãáà ßÚÞÇÈ ßæäå ÍÝíÏ áÞÇÆÏ ÔíÚí ¡áÇíæÌÏ ÏæáÉ ÃÎÑí Ýì ÇáÚÇáã ÓæÝ ÊõäÝÐ Íßã ÇáÅÚÏÇã È


ÌæáÉ ÇáÕÍÇÝÉ ÇáÚÇáãíÉ æ ÇáÛÑÈíÉ : ÊÑÌãÉ : åÇáÉ ÃÈæ Óáíã
Çáíæã 1-12-2015
(ÇáÊÍáíáÇÊ ÇáÓíÇÓíÉ ááÕÍÝ ÇáÃÌäÈíÉ )
ÕÍíÝÉ ÇáÛÇÑÏíÇä ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ:
ÕÍíÝÉ ÇáÛÇÑÏíÇä ÊäÊÞÏ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ .... ÇáÚÞÇÈ ÇáÞÇÓí æÇáÚäíÝ áä íÌáÈ ÇáÃãä !!
ãÍÑÑíä .
áÇíæÌÏ ÏæáÉ ÃÎÑí Ýí ÇáÚÇáã Êäæí Ãä ÊõÍÖÑ äÝÓåÇ áÞØÚ ÑÃÓ ÅäÓÇä ÔÇÈ ¡æÅáÞÇÁ ÈÞÇíÇå ÃãÇã Çáãáà ßÚÞÇÈ ßæäå ÍÝíÏ áÞÇÆÏ ÔíÚí ¡áÇíæÌÏ ÏæáÉ ÃÎÑí Ýì ÇáÚÇáã ÓæÝ ÊõäÝÐ Íßã ÇáÅÚÏÇã È 1,000 ãÏæä ÈÍÌÉ ÔÊã ÇáÐÇÊ ÇáÅáåíÉ .Ýì ãäØÞÉ ÇáÔÑÞ ÇáÃæÓØ ÊÍÏíÏÇð ¡ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ áÇ ÊÚÏ ÇáÏæáÉ ÇáæÍíÏÉ ÇáÊí áÏíåÇ ÓÌá ÈÛíÖ Ýì ãÌÇá ÍÞæÞ ÇáÅäÓÇä Èá ÅíÑÇä ÃíÖÇ ÍíË ÃõÚÏã ãÇ íÞÇÑÈ 700 ÔÎÕ Ýí ÈÏÇíÉ åÐÇ ÇáÚÇã ÈÚÖ ãä åÐå ÇáÊåã "ÓÈ æÞÐÝ ÇáÐÇÊ ÇáÅáåíÉ " ÇáÈÇßÓÊÇä ÊõÚÏ ÃÞÓì ÏæáÉ Ýì ÊØÈíÞ ÚÞæÈÉ ÇáÅÚÏÇã ÈÍÌÉ ÇáßÝÑ ¡æíÏæÑ ÌÏá Íæá ÊÍæíá ÇáÊåãÉ Åáì "ÌÑíãÉ ÌäÇÆíÉ" ¡ÇáÈÍÑíä ÊÞãÚ ãæÇØäíåÇ ÇáÔíÚÉ ¡ÞØÑ ãÊåãÉ ÃäåÇ ãä ÇæÌÏ ÇáÌåÇÏííä æÇáãÊØÑÝíä "ÇáÅÑåÇÈ" .áßä ÍÊì Öãä åÐå ÇáÔÑÇßÉ íæÌÏ ÞÇÓã ãÔÊÑß ÝíãÇ íÎÕ ÇáããáßÉ ÇáÚÑÈíÉ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ æåæ ÇáÅÚÏÇã ÇáÌãÇÚí ááÓÌäÇÁ ááÃÓÝ áã íÓÈÞ áåÇ ãËíá .
ÅíÑÇä ÝÚáÊ ÔíÁ ããÇËá æãÔÇÈå ÈÚÏ ÇáËæÑÉ ¡ãÚ Ðáß¡ÝÇä ÞÑÇÑ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ÈÅÚÏÇã 50 ÔÎÕ ÈÊåãÉ ÇáÅÑåÇÈ Çäå ÞÑÇÑ ãÎÌá ÈÍÌÉ Ãäåã ãä ÏÇÚÔ ¡ÙåÑ ÇáÚÏíÏ ãä ÇáÔÈÇÈ-ÇáÔíÚÉ- ÇáÕÛÇÑ ÇáÓä ÇáÐíä Êã ÇÚÊÞÇáåã Ýì ÇáÚÇã ÇáãÇÖí Ýì ãÙÇåÑÇÊ ÖÏ ÇáÊÚÕÈ¡ÝáÇ íæÌÏ ÏæáÉ ÃÎÑì ÓæÝ ÊÕÏÑ Íõßã ÇáÅÚÏÇã ÈäåãÉ ÇáÅáÍÇÏ ÖÏ ÔÇÚÑ ããíÒ (ÇáÅÔÇÑÉ åäÇ Åáì ÇáÔÇÚÑ ÇáÝáÓØíäí ÇÔÑÝ ÝíÇÖ ÇáÐí ÍßãÊ Úáíå ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ Íßã ÇáÅÚÏÇã ) Åä ÇáßËíÑ ããÇ ÊÞæã Èå ÌãÇÚÉ ÊäÙíã ÏÇÚÔ ÇáÅÑåÇÈíÉ ãä ÃÚãÇá ÈÑÈÑíÉ æ åãÌíÉ åí à ÚãÇá ÑæÊíäíÉ ÈÇáäÓÈÉ ááÓÚæÏíÉ .ãä ÇáÛÑíÈ Åä ÊÓÚì ÈÑíØÇäíÇ ááÊÚÇæä ãÚ æÒÇÑÉ ÇáÚÏá ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ÍÊì ÈÚÏ ÇáÖÛØ ãä ÞÈá Ìíãí ßæÑÈä æÇáãÚÇÑÖ ãÇíßá ßæÝ¡ áíÓ ÛÑíÈ Åä åÐå ÇáÊÕÑÝÇÊ ÇáÈÑÈÑíÉ æ ÇáåãÌíÉ åí ÈãËÇÈÉ ÑæÊíä áÏí ÇáÃãä ÇáÓÚæÏí ¡ãä ÇáÓÎÑíÉ Ãä íÔíÑ ÑÆíÓ æÒÑÇÁ áãÒÇíÇ æ ÃåÏÇÝ ÇáÊÚÇæä ÇáÈÑíØÇäí æ ÇáÓÚæÏí ¡ÝÞÏ ÕÑÎ ááÞäÇÉ ÇáÑÇÈÚÉ ááÃÎÈÇÑ ÈÇä ÊÚÇæä ÇáÃãäí ãÚ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ÞÏ ÃÍÈØ ÚãáíÉ ÅÑåÇÈíÉ ÖÏ ÈÑíØÇäíÇ ÈÇáãÞÇÈá ÇáÊÚÇæä ãÚ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ÞÏ ÃÛäì ÔÑßÇÊ ÈíÚ ÇáÓáÇÍ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ ææÇÌÏ ÚãáÇð ááÃÝÑÇÏ ÇáÈÑíØÇäííä . æáßä åäÇáß Ëãä íÌÈ Úáì ÈÑíØÇäíÇ ÏÝÚå ÝÇáÏÚÇíÉ ÇáÊí ÊÓæÞ áåÇ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ÓæÇÁ Ýì ÇáÌÇãÚÇÊ Ãæ ÚÈÑ ÇáÇäÊÑäÊ æÇáÝÖÇÆíÇÊ ¡ÊÔÍä ÇáÚÏÇÁ ÖÏ ÇáÅÓáÇã ÝåÐÇ áä íÝÚá áÈÑíØÇäíÇ ÔíÁ æáßäå ãÄÐí ÝÈÚÖ ÇáÓáÇÍ ÇáÐí ÇÔÊÑÊå ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ãä ÈÑíØÇäíÇ íõÓÊÎÏã ÖÏ ÇáÍæËííä Ýì Çáíãä ããÇ ÃÏì Åáì ãÞÊá ÇáãÏäííä æ ÊÔÑíÏ ÇáãÆÇÊ ãä ãäÇÒáåã æ ÇáÛÇÑÇÊ ÇáÌæíÉ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ ÖÏ Çáíãäííä áÇ ÊÝÚá ÔíÆÇ ÖÏ ÏÇÚÔ ÍÊì ÈÇáäÓÈÉ ááÃãä ÇáÞæãí ÇáÈÑíØÇäí Ýì ÇáãÏì ÇáÞÑíÈ æÝì ÚãáíÉ ÍÓÇÈíÉ åÐÇ áä íÌÚá Çáíãä ãßÇä Âãä ÈÇáäÓÈÉ áÏÇÚÔ æÇáÞÇÚÏÉ Ýåí áíÓÊ Åáì ÌÇäÈäÇ ¡ÍÊì áæ ÇÏÚÊ ÃäåÇ ãä ÍáÝÇÆäÇ ¡ÝÇä ÇäåíÇÑ ÇáããáßÉ ÇáÓÚæÏíÉ Óíßæä ÇäåíÇÑ ááãäØÞÉ ÈÃßãáåÇ æááÚÇáã ßÇÝÉ
ÇÓÊÞÑÇÑ ÇáããáßÉ íäÈÚ ãä ÊÛíÑ ÓíÇÓÊåÇ æ ÇáÌíá ÇáÔÇÈ ÈÏà íÏÑß Ðáß æáßä åÐÇ áä íÍÏË ÈÏæä æÖæÍ Ýì ÇáÑÄíÉ ¡æÇáÚãá ÈÇáãÈÇÏÆ æ ÇáäÞÏ ÇáÐÇÊí ÓæÝ äßæä ÓÚÏÇÁ áÊÒæíÏåã Èå .
ÕÍíÝÉ ÇáÇÈÒæÑÝÑ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ :
æÌå äÙÑ ÇáÕÍíÝÉ" Ãäå ãä ÇáÎØà ÊæÓíÚ ÇáÚãáíÇÊ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ Ýì ÓæÑíÇ".
ÈÇÊ ãä ÇáãÚÊÇÏ ÓãÇÚ ÇáÓíÇÓííä Çäå ÊÞÚ Úáì ÚÇÊÞåã ãÓÆæáíÉ ßÈíÑÉ æãåÇã ËÞíáÉ áÇÊÎÇÐ ÞÑÇÑ ÇáÐåÇÈ ááÍÑÈ Ýí ÓæÑíÇ Ãã áÇ ¡ÇáÍÞíÞÉ ÇáãÄÓÝÉ Ýí Ðáß ÅääÇ ÚãáíÇð æÝì ßá ÇáÃÍæÇá äÎæÖ ÇáÍÑÈ Ýì ÇáÚÑÇÞ æÓæÑíÇ Úáì ÇáÃÞá ãäÐ ÚÇã . ÇáÌÏá ÇáÍÇÏ ÝíãÇ ÃääÇ áæ ÔÇÑßäÇ Ýì ÇáÍÑÈ ÖÏ ÏÇÚÔ ãÚ ÃãÑíßÇ æ ÝÑäÓÇ ÝÇäå ãä Çáããßä ÍÏæË Ôí ãÇ åäÇ Ýì ÈÑíØÇäíÇ .
áßä íÚÇäì ÇáÈÚÖ ãäåã ãä ÊÃäíÈ ÇáÖãíÑ ¡ßæä ÇáÈÚÖ ãä íÞæÏ åÐå ÇáÃÛáÈíÉ ÇáÈÑáãÇäíÉ Ýí åÐÇ ÇáäÞÇÔ íÑÓã ãÓÇÑ áÇíãßä ÊÝÓíÑå æäÓíÇäå ÍíË ãÇÒÇá ÇáÚÇáã íÏÝÚ Ëãä ãÇ ÃÊÝÞ Úáíå Ýì ÇáÓÇÈÞ Ýì æíÓÊ ãÇäÓÊÑ¡ãÊÇÈÚÉ æãáÇÍÙÉ ÇáÊØæÑÇÊ æ ÇáÃÚãÇá ÇáÊí ÇÑÊßÈÊåÇ ÏÇÚÔ ÞÑÑÊ ÑÆÇÓÉ ÇáæÒÑÇÁ Ýì ÓÈÊãÈÑ ãä ÇáÚÇã ÇáãÇÖí ÈÏæä ÖÌÉ ÊÃíÏ ÇáÛÇÑÇÊ ÇáÌæíÉ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ Úáì ÇáÚÑÇÞ .ÇÊÝÞÊ ÞíÇÏÇÊ ÇáÃÍÒÇÈ ÇáÑÆíÓíÉ æ ßÇä ÇáÊÕæíÊ ÈÔßá ÓÇÍÞ Úáì ÖÑÈ ÇáÚÑÇÞ ãäÐ Ðáß ÇáæÞÊ ÇáØíÑÇä Çáãáßí ÇáÈÑíØÇäí ÃÌÑì ãÆÇÊ ÇáØáÚÇÊ æ ÇáåÌãÇÊ ÇáÌæíÉ .Ýí äÝÓ ÇáæÞÊ ÝÇä ÇáØíÑÇä ÇáÈÑíØÇäí íÞæã ÈãåÇã ÇÓÊÎÈÇÑíÉ ÊÌÓÓíå ãä ÇáÌæ æåÐÇ Ýíå ÏÚã áæÌÓÊíì æÝäí áÞæÇÊ ÇáÊÍÇáÝ ÇáÏæáí ÖÏ ÏÇÚÔ Ýì ÓæÑíÇ æÊã ÒÑÚ ØíÇÑíä ÈÑíØÇäííä Ýí ÞæÇÊ ÇáÊÍÇáÝ ÇáÏæáí .ÇáÍÞ Ýì ÇáÏÝÇÚ Úä ÇáäÝÓ ßãÇ äÕ ÚáíÉ ãíËÇÞ ÇáÃãã ÇáãÊÍÏÉ ¡ÏÇÚãÇ ÝßÑÉ ÇáÛÇÑÇÊ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ Úáì ÇáÚÑÇÞ ¡æãÇÒÇá íÄíÏ ÇáÛÇÑÇÊ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ Úáì ÓæÑíå ÈÇáÑÛã íæÌÏ ÈÚÖ ÞíÇÏÇÊ ÍÒÈ ÇáÚãÇá ÊÏÑß Ðáß –ÏÇÚÔ –ÈÇáãÞÇÈá Ôä ÚãáíÇÊ ÇäÊÞÇãíÉ ÖÏ ÇáÞæÇÊ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ ãä ãÞÑÉ ÇáÑÆíÓí ÈÇáÑÞÇ ÎáÇá 12 ÔåÑ ÇáãÇÖíÉ æßÇäÊ ÏÇÚÔ æÑÇÁ åÐå ÇáÚãáíÇÊ ÇáÇäÊÞÇãíÉ æåì ÊÓÚì áÊæÓíÚ äØÇÞ ÚãáíÇÊåÇ Ýì ÇáÎÇÑÌ ÈÇáÞíÇã ÈÚÏÉ ÚãáíÇÊ ÅÑåÇÈíÉ ÖÏ ÈÑíØÇäíÇ .æÞÇãÊ ÏÇÚÔ ÈÊÌäíÏ ãÇ íÞÇÑÈ 800 ÔÎÕ ãä ÇáÈÑíØÇäííä ÇáãÓáãíä ÇáÐíä ÇáÊÍÞæÇ ÈÕÝæÝ ÊäÙíã ÏÇÚÔ ÇáÐí íæÇÕá Úáì äÔÑ ÅíÏíæáæÌíÉ Êåíä ÞíãäÇ ÇáÈÑíØÇäíÉ æÊÞæíÖ ÓáÇãÉ ãÌÊãÚäÇ æÊÞÊá ÃÔÎÇÕ ÈÑíØÇäííä ÇáÌäÓíÉ ¡ÝÝí ÔåÑ íæäíæ ÞÇãÊ ÏÇÚÔ ÈÞÊá 30 ÓÇÆÍ ÈÑíØÇäí Úáì ÇáÓæÇÍá ÇáÊæäÓíÉ ¡Ýí Ðáß ÇáÍíä ÐßÑäÇ ÈÃäå ÍÇä ÇáæÞÊ ááÇÓÊíÞÇÙ ÝáÞÏ ÈÏÃÊ ÏÇÚÔ ÈÔä ÍÑÈåÇ ÚáíäÇ æåÐÇ Çáíæã ÈÇÊ ÃßËÑ æÖæÍÇð æÕÏÞÇð .æáßä ÇáÓÄÇá ÇáÌæåÑí ÇáÐí Úáì ÑÆÇÓÉ ÇáæÒÑÇÁ ÊÞÏíã ÇáÅÌÇÈÉ Úáíå ÅÐÇ ØÇáÈ ÏíÝíÏ ßÇãíÑæä ÈÇáÊÕæíÊ æåÐÇ áíÓÊ ÇáØÑíÞÉ ÇáÊí íÌÈ ÇáÊÚÇãá ãÚåÇ ãÚ ÊäÙíã ÇáÏæáÉ ÇáÅÓáÇãíÉ Ýì ÓæÑíÇ ÅÐÇ áã äÞÑÑ ÇáÐåÇÈ ááÍÑÈ Ýì ÓæÑíÇ –åÐÇ ÚãáíÇð íÍÏË- áßä Úáì ÇáÃÞá ãÇåí ÃÝÖá ØÑíÞÉ áÖãÇä ÃääÇ äÄíÏ Ðáß .ÅÐä ÝÓæÝ äÛÑÞ Ýì ãÓÊäÝÚ ÓíÇÓíí æãÚÞÏ ÌíæÇÓÊÑÇÊíÌì æÊÇÑíÎí æÚÓßÑí ÇáÊí äÓãÚåÇ åäÇ æåäÇß áÏÚã Çì ÞÑÇÑ ÊÊÎÐå ãä æÌåÉ äÙÑß . ÝÚáíÇð¡ ßãÇ íÞæá ÏíÝíÏ ßÇãíÑæä "ßáãÇ ØÇá ÇáæÞÊ æÓãÍäÇ áÏæáÉ ÊäÙíã ÇáÏæáÉ ÇáÅÓáÇãíÉ ÈÇáÊãÏÏ æÇáäãæ Ýì ÓæÑíÇ æÈÏÇÑÓÉ áÌæåÑ åÐå ÇáÌãÇÚÉ ÇáÊí ÊÎØØ áÈäÇÁ ÇáÎáÇÝÉ ÇáÅÓáÇãíÉ ÇáÐíä ÑÛÈÊåã Ýì äåÇíÉ ÇáÃãÑ ÇáæÕæá Åáì Íá ãÚ åÄáÇÁ æÓíßæä ãä ÇáÕÚÈ ÅÍÑÇÒ Ãí åÏÝ Ãæ äÊíÌÉ ÈÚÏ ÇáãÝÇæÖÇÊ Ãæ ÇáÊæÕá ãÚåã Åáì Íá æÓØ¡ áßä ÍÞíÞÉ ßãÇ íÏÚì ÇáÈÚÖ ÝÇä ÓáÇÍ ÇáÌæ Çáãáßí ÇáÈÑíØÇäí ãä Çáããßä Çä áÇ íÍÞÞ ÇåÏÇÝÉ Èá ÓíÌÚá ÇáÃãæÑ ÃÓæÁ ¡ãËá åÐå ÇáÞÑÇÑÇÊ áíÓÊ ÈÇáÈÓíØÉ Ãæ ÇáÓåáÉ ÅÐÇ åí ßÐáß Ýáä íßæä áÏíäÇ Çì ãÍÇÏËÇÊ ÏæáíÉ ÕÚÈÉ æáæ ÍÊì Íá æÇÍÏ ÝÞØ .




Such decisions are not simple or straightforward. If they were, we would not now be having such a difficult national conversation. Nor is there a single “correct” solution. Even the most passionate advocates of bombing, and their most dedicated opponents, must admit there is room for error in their judgments and a need for flexibility in their approach. And so when Mr Cameron sets out his best case in favour, as he did in the Commons last Thursday, he and his arguments deserve to be heard with attention and respect.


The prime minister made many persuasive points. He is right to say that Britain cannot and must not depend on others for its defence and that no action comes without risk. It is important, too, that we show solidarity with our long-time ally, France, after the great hurt it has sustained. There is no doubt that Britain faces an extremely serious security threat and that, regretfully, the likelihood of a successful Isis operation on British soil is growing. If we do not suppress Isis now, then when? he asked.
Mr Cameron was correct to stress the twin imperatives of encouraging and assisting the moderate political and armed opposition to the Assad regime in Damascus and of simultaneously trying to advance the Vienna peace process that recently revived moribund negotiations first begun in Geneva in 2012. Mr Cameron rightly highlighted Britain’s humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, which has indeed been significant, in terms of cash, if not refugee placements, by comparison with most other countries. And recalling mistakes made in Iraq, he placed welcome emphasis on ensuring adequate, collective funding for Syrian postwar reconstruction.
These were key elements in what he claimed was an internationally agreed “comprehensive strategy”. But while not rejecting much of Mr Cameron’s statement, and without questioning his sincerity, it must be said the prime minister’s proposal, taken in the round, is neither comprehensive nor a strategy. On the contrary, it is, to a worrying degree, an exercise in wishful thinking. Mr Cameron has not yet made a convincing case for expanded military action in Syria.
There are three main areas of unresolved, critical concern. First, it remains wholly unclear how additional British bombing, however skilful and accurate, would further the primary objective of dislodging Isis from Raqqa and the rest of its territory in Syria and Iraq, an essential aim if the pernicious concept of a reconstituted, omnipotent caliphate is to be exploded. Only substantial, well-trained ground forces could do this – and western troops are not available. Nobody, not even the French, is prepared to risk them.
Notwithstanding the suspiciously chimerical army of 70,000 rebel fighters conjured by Mr Cameron from the northern deserts, capable local ground forces are mostly lacking. In a state fracturing along religious and ethnic fault lines – with Shia-dominated Iran supporting the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, himself a member of the Shia Alawite sect, in a deadly struggle with predominantly Sunni forces and Kurdish separatists, in addition to the murderous Isis – they may be impossible to muster. The Kurds, responsible for Isis’s few significant battlefield reverses to date, chiefly wish to secure their own territory, not fight a liberation war for all Syria. And Syria’s Sunni Arab fighters (as became the case in post-surge, post-Petraeus Iraq in 2007) are divided, unreliable and badly led.


And even if Isis were routed on the ground, what then? Another vacuum in another ungoverned space, to be filled by whom? Iranian-commanded Shia militia from Baghdad? Assad army forces backed by Russian air support? If Mr Cameron, possibly backed by France, is seriously suggesting (as his memorandum to the foreign affairs select committee implied) that the international community cut a deal with Assad’s regime to tackle Isis and so secure the lands of eastern Syria, he must think again. The Syrian people, not least the Sunni Muslim majority, would never stand for it. Neither would the Gulf states and many other coalition members, whatever Russia and Iran might say.
It is at this point that the spectre of Iraq after the 2003 invasion looms especially large. Saddam Hussein’s regime, though secular in nature, was dominated by and protective of the country’s Sunni minority. After the dictator fell, Iraq’s bigger Shia population eventually seized dominant governmental control. Many Sunnis felt disenfranchised. Their alienation in turn spawned the Sunni rebellion against the American occupiers in 2005 and the rise of al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, the forerunners of Sunni-led Isis. Although they are a majority in Syria, Sunni Muslims were also marginalised by Assad’s Alawite Shia regime. It is they who have stood at the heart of the anti-Assad uprising since it began in 2011.
Thus if a lasting political settlement is to be reached in either country, it is absolutely essential that Sunni interests and aspirations are fully recognised. If Isis and other extremist groups are to be defeated and permanently excluded and inclusive, democratic governance established, the victorious charge must ultimately be led by moderate, indigenous Sunnis, not by vengeful western politicians or well-meaning UN mediators or self-interested Kurds or Tehran-backed Shia militia. Their presumptuous intervention now, as in the past, would only exacerbate existing divisions.
Practical, credible measures to attain this political imperative are nowhere to be found in Mr Cameron’s strategy. Likewise, the overriding necessity, in Syrian eyes – of deposing Assad – is given no great priority and, indeed, is curiously downplayed. Whatever Mr Cameron may pretend, Tehran’s leadership is not onside – it still argues, absurdly, that Assad should stand for re-election at the end of a transitional period. Yet the prime minister’s plan deliberately bypasses such complexities. By suggesting he has the solutions, and promising what he cannot deliver, Mr Cameron, like Tony Blair in 2003, stretches public trust in the government’s case to breaking point.
Second, Mr Cameron’s comprehensive strategy places far too much faith in a positive outcome in the Vienna peace process, which has yet to produce anything much beyond a deceptive show of international amity. Its overly optimistic 18-month Syrian transition road map is a mere paper trail so far. Assad shows no sign of stepping down, Moscow and Tehran show no sign (as yet) of pushing him, the main Syrian opposition coalition says it will boycott any talks while Assad is still involved, and there is no agreement on which of the many other rebel groups are “moderate” enough to attend the talks. This is treacherous ground from which to launch a military campaign.
Likewise, the “global coalition” energetically promoted by President Hollande since the Paris attacks and backed by Mr Cameron, which in reality boils down to a faint hope of increased military co-operation between Moscow and Washington, fails to inspire confidence. Entirely lacking is a vision for a Syria whole and free. Instead, Britain’s international partners can often resemble vultures, contesting the dismembered parts. The Saudis and Qataris remain at total odds with Iran, the Russians and the Turks are at each other’s throats over border violations, and there is still no broad agreement with Moscow (despite Mr Hollande’s valiant efforts) over who should actually be bombed and where. Indeed, President Vladimir Putin increasingly plays the role of cowboy, not collaborator.
In the meantime, Britain’s closest ally, the US, is running on idle, with an insouciant, strangely detached Barack Obama waxing ever more philosophical, though grimly determined not to be sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire. And as long as Assad, the original villain of the piece, stays, the refugees, who fear him more than Isis, will just keep on coming. As we report today from the Turkey-Syria border, the very last thing those Syrian civilians who remain want is yet more heavy ordnance descending on their heads.
Third and last, there is scant ground for confidence that Mr Cameron’s comprehensive strategy will go any significant way towards addressing the core problem of contagion. By this is meant the apparently inexorable, global spread of jihadi ideology and the terrifying willingness of far too many young Muslims, from London and Birmingham and Bradford, from Lille and Brussels and Copenhagen, and from many other parts of Europe and North America, to reject the liberal values, standards and democratically agreed, albeit imperfect laws of their home countries – and to resort instead to extremist, fundamentalist thinking, arbitrary, divisive and misogynistic norms and the most awful violence to express their vision of a better society.
Isis did not invent the idea of a holy war or crusade. It has no monopoly and no patent, historical or modern, on fanatical, religiously inspired intolerance. Nor did it invent fascism or apocalyptic nihilism, although its beliefs and methods ape both. If Isis is destroyed but not discredited, debunked and exposed for the evil sham it is, other, possibly ever more extreme Islamist groups will likely take its place. As we said at the beginning, Britain is already at war. It is already assisting its French and American allies militarily. But at bottom, it is a war of values and ideas, not of more and more bombs.
This is the fight we must win, however long it takes. Mr Cameron has failed to make the case for expanded military action in Syria. His proposal should not be supported.

(CNN)Cornered and under fire in Saint-Denis apartment on Wednesday, a defiant 26-year-old Hasna Ait Boulahcen screamed back at French police before detonating a suicide vest.
A relative of one of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the suspected ringleader of the Paris attacks, Boulahcen's presence at the time of the police raid has raised questions about her role in the massacre, and the role of women as potential ISIS front line fighters.
In recent months, horrific stories have emerged of the sexual slavery of women and girls by ISIS, some of whom have been bought and sold at slave markets. Could the blast detonated by Boulahcen be a sign that women's role with ISIS ranks is changing?

Why do some women join ISIS? 07:54
"It's certainly ISIS' first female suicide bomber," said Mia Bloom, author of "Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists."
"Up until now ISIS has been very clear. The role for women is cooking, cleaning and childcare. They do not have women on the front lines," she said.
Passive agents or frontline jihadis?
A January report from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ICSR) said ISIS has been appealing more to women and girls in its propaganda.
"ISIS has increased its female-focused efforts, writing manifestos directly for women, directing sections of its online magazine publications Dabiq to the 'sisters of the Islamic State' and allowing women to have a voice within their recruitment strategy -- albeit via social media," the report said.
ISIS sees women as crucial in growing the population of jihadi loyalists, the report said, so that the Islamic State survives and expands beyond this generation.
In many cases, women are also seen as "safe" recruits, especially if they're related to a male fighter, Bloom said.
"It's a fantastic vetting mechanism for the terrorist organizations. They are always worried about being infiltrated and so if someone is related to an existing member they feel that they're most trustworthy. So this is something we see -- it's all in the family," she said.
Who are the women of ISIS?
Is the blast a game-changer?

Bloom said it's unclear if the Boulahcen's death by suicide-blast in Paris will impact ISIS' use of women in their push to establish an Islamic State.

"Whether it's a game-changer is really going to depend on what is the reaction -- are the ISIS fanboys and the rank and file going to celebrate this woman? Or are they going to say, 'We really don't approve. We prefer our women at home, under the veil, cooking, cleaning and giving birth to little mujahideen'?"
Nikita Malik, a senior researcher at the Quilliam Think Tank, told Christiane Amanpour she believes the detonation of Wednesday's suicide bomb by a woman is more of an exception than the norm.
"It was done more of a defense mechanism rather than as an act of violence. Islamic State has said in its propaganda many times women are to remain in the home and really their participation in jihad is more nurturing role as a mother and a wife," she said.
Military analyst, Lt. General Mark Hertling told CNN that he's observed that female suicide bombers in other terrorist organizations often are acting out of last resort, as they have no status in those societies if their husband dies.
"The spiritual advisers in some of these terrorist groups say, 'Why not take the easy way out and go to heaven and take a few infidels with you? In many of these cases it is an action of last resort for some of these young women."
From Scottish teen to ISIS bride and recruiter: the Aqsa Mahmood story
More women joining the caliphate

Blogger romanticizes life with ISIS 03:17
Regardless of their exact role within the group, the threat of western women of becoming radicalized is looming large.
Malik said countering the increasing number of women going to Syria to join ISIS requires not just debunking the romantic myths of finding a strong fighter husband but theological ideas too.
"I know it sounds like a contradiction, because once they get there their lives are limited but somehow they think this is divinely mandated. A response to it would have to deal with the theological inaccuracies in some of the propaganda they've revealed as well."
Three Denver girls set out for Syria, FBI brings them back
ÇáÊÞÑíÑ ÇáËÇäì áÓì Çä Çä
How is this not World War III?
BY: Frida Ghitis
CNN)Turkish forces shot down a Russian plane near the Turkish-Syrian border on Tuesday, dangerously escalating a conflict that is expanding ever more rapidly and unpredictably.
Take a step back and look at what Syria's war has wrought: Only days after the Paris attacks -- one of the worst terrorist attacks on European soil since World War II -- and with the unofficial capital of the European Union, Brussels, still under a partial lockdown, a member of NATO downed a Russia fighter jet.
Turkey won't apologize for downing Russian warplane, Erdogan says
If this had occurred during the Cold War, we would be bracing for the possibility of a nuclear war. Thankfully, that conflict is over. Instead of dialing nuclear codes, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council while NATO summoned its own emergency meeting.
Don't misinterpret the moves as evidence of calm; a furious Russia has called Turkey "accomplices of terror" and Putin warned of "significant consequences." And these are just some of the latest developments in the world's most complicated conflict.
Just after the Paris massacres, Pope Francis said the terrorist attacks were part of a piecemeal World War III. But it is the war in Syria itself that is morphing into this century's world war.
The Syrian conflict, which turned deadly in 2011 when President Bashar al-Assad responded to calls for democracy by massacring protesters, has become a global vortex of violence, a black hole that swallows other conflicts. Day after day the number of disputes and rivalries fueling the fighting on that part of the Levant grows, bringing new firepower and more recruits.
It started with pro-democracy activists against Assad's forces; it drew a competing collection of armed opposition groups. It pitted moderates against extremists, and then extremists against ultra-extremists.
It rages with the sectarian fury of Shiites against Sunnis, Arabs against Iranians. Lebanon's Hezbollah, backed by Iran, fights against militias backed by Gulf Arabs. Al Qaeda's al Nusra Front competes with ISIS, the Kurds fight against ISIS and against the Syrian military and Turkey fights against the Kurds, while feebly taking on ISIS and viscerally pushing for Assad's ouster.
And there's much more, with greater geopolitical consequences. There's Russia, the U.S. and the "anti-ISIS coalition," and soon a France-assembled bloc to fight ISIS.
There is both more and less than meets the eye. While Russia and Turkey have boasted of fighting ISIS, the "civilized" world's anointed enemy, the fact is that each has other objectives in mind, which is why Tuesday's shootdown won't be dismissed as an accident in a crowded theater of war.

Russia is in Syria not to fight ISIS but to save the Assad regime as a permanent Russian ally. Turkey has two goals: It wants to clip the wings of the independence-minded Kurds, but it also wants to see Assad fall.
And while Turkey's goals differ from those of its NATO allies -- particularly because Ankara has largely turned a blind eye to ISIS, an enemy of the Kurds -- the NATO bloc mostly agrees on its antipathy towards Assad.
Then there is an even larger geopolitical contest at play. Russia is working to erode America's standing in the Middle East, advancing Putin's agenda of challenging and defying Washington.

While U.S. President Barack Obama was trying to reassure America that its very measured efforts to contain and degrade ISIS were paying off, Putin sent a massive military force to Syria and recast the conflict. Assad may have been about to fall, but Putin, now working on the same side as Iran and Hezbollah, made sure that won't be happening any time soon. And now that ISIS has launched attacks in Western Europe, Assad's hold on power looks more likely to survive.
Confused? This is only scratching the surface. Everyone in this fight has enemies and friends on opposing sides.
This is what a world war looks like: strange bedfellows, conflicting agendas, alliances of convenience. And if you think the core of the fighting, the issues and ideologies at stake, seem muddled, try to find out what World War I was all about. Clarity is not a requirement for a world war.
The Syrian World War already involves scores of countries. Last year, the U.S. assembled a wide-ranging coalition of more than 60 nations. From South Korea to Australia, governments have participated in varying degrees in the campaign to defeat ISIS.
ISIS, meanwhile, has spread its area of operations. It has also added franchises and its followers have attacked targets around the world.
The Syria-based organization not only controls territory in Syria and Iraq; its followers hold sway in Libya, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Nigeria and other parts of Africa. And the list of groups pledging allegiance to the self-styled caliphate spans tens of thousands of miles, reaching as far as Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Algeria and the Philippines.
Many people of many nationalities have died in Syria and Iraq. But ISIS' own terrorist propaganda has broadcast the murder of Americans, Britons, Egyptians, Japanese, Koreans, Chinese and civilians of other nationalities.
Refugees from Syria have settled as far away as Uruguay, and terrorist attacks from individuals linked to the Syrian fighters have not only killed people in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey, but also in Canada, France, Australia, Nigeria, Denmark and elsewhere. And let's not forget Egypt, where intelligence experts and Russian authorities believe a Russian passenger plane was deliberately downed just a few weeks ago.
Does it sound like a world war?
The term "world war" obviously conjures the two great conflicts of the 20th century. A striking parallel this time is the reluctance of the United States to get involved -- the public wish to stay out, to say, "This is not our fight."
It's impossible to know just how far the analogy will hold. But it's worth remembering that those conflicts only came to an end when the U.S. found it impossible to pretend it was not affected by a brutal conflict raging war thousands of miles from America's shores.
The Washington post :
This might be the most controversial theory for what’s behind the rise of ISIS

By Jim Tankersley November 30 at 6:45 AM Follow @jimtankersley

In this undated photo, militants of the Islamic State group display weapons and wave flags in a convoy through Raqqa city in Syria on a road leading to Iraq. (Militant Web site via AP)
A year after his 700-page opus "Capital in the Twenty-First Century" stormed to the top of America's best-seller lists, Thomas Piketty is out with a new argument about income inequality. It may prove more controversial than his book, which continues to generate debate in political and economic circles.
The new argument, which Piketty spelled out recently in the French newspaper Le Monde, is this: Inequality is a major driver of Middle Eastern terrorism, including the Islamic State attacks on Paris earlier this month — and Western nations have themselves largely to blame for that inequality.
Piketty writes that the Middle East's political and social system has been made fragile by the high concentration of oil wealth into a few countries with relatively little population. If you look at the region between Egypt and Iran — which includes Syria — you find several oil monarchies controlling between 60 and 70 percent of wealth, while housing just a bit more than 10 percent of the 300 million people living in that area. (Piketty does not specify which countries he's talking about, but judging from a study he co-authored last year on Middle East inequality, it appears he means Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. By his numbers, they accounted for 16 percent of the region's population in 2012 and almost 60 percent of its gross domestic product.)

Where does the Islamic State get its funding?
The Islamic State is one of the most well-funded terrorist organizations in the world. So where does it get its money? (Jorge Ribas/The Washington Post)
This concentration of so much wealth in countries with so small a share of the population, he says, makes the region "the most unequal on the planet."
Within those monarchies, he continues, a small slice of people controls most of the wealth, while a large — including women and refugees — are kept in a state of "semi-slavery." Those economic conditions, he says, have become justifications for jihadists, along with the casualties of a series of wars in the region perpetuated by Western powers.
His list starts with the first Gulf War, which he says resulted in allied forces returning oil "to the emirs." Though he does not spend much space connecting those ideas, the clear implication is that economic deprivation and the horrors of wars that benefited only a select few of the region's residents have, mixed together, become what he calls a "powder keg" for terrorism across the region.

Piketty is particularly scathing when he blames the inequality of the region, and the persistence of oil monarchies that perpetuate it, on the West: "These are the regimes that are militarily and politically supported by Western powers, all too happy to get some crumbs to fund their [soccer] clubs or sell some weapons. No wonder our lessons in social justice and democracy find little welcome among Middle Eastern youth."
Terrorism that is rooted in inequality, Piketty continues, is best combated economically.
To gain credibility with those who do not share in the region's wealth, Western countries should demonstrate that they are more concerned with the social development of the region than they are with their own financial interests and relationships with ruling families. The way to do this, he says, is to ensure that Middle eastern oil money funds "regional development," including far more education.
He concludes by looking inward, at France, decrying its discrimination in the hiring of immigrants and the high unemployment levels among those populations. He says Europe must turn away from "austerity" and reinvigorate its model of integration and job creation, and notes that the continent accepted a net 1 million immigrants per year before the financial crisis.
The argument has not gained much notice in the United States thus far. It rests on some controversial principles, not the least of which is the question of how unequal the Middle East is compared to the rest of the world — a problem rooted in the region's poor quality of economic statistics. In his paper last year, Piketty and a co-author concluded inequality was in fact quite high.
"Under plausible assumptions," the paper states in its abstract, "the top 10% income share (for the Middle East) could be well over 60%, and the top 1% share might exceed 25% (vs. 20% in the United States, 11% in Western Europe, and 17% in South Africa)."
Those would, indeed, be jarring levels. They are the high end of the scenarios Piketty lays out in the paper. Whether they are a root cause of the Islamic State is a debate that is very likely just beginning.



 
·  ãÊÇÈÚÇÊ ÅÚáÇãíÉ
·  ÇáãÍÑÑ


ãÊÇÈÚÇÊ ÅÚáÇãíÉ:
ãÕÇÏÑ ÊßÔÝ ÇÓÈÇÈ ÇÓÊÞÇáÉ ÛÓÇä Èä ÌÏæ ãä ÞäÇÉ ÇáÌÒíÑÉ



: 5
: 1


:










 



ÌÑíÏÉ ÇáÕÈÇÍ
ÝáÓØíä - ÊÃÓÓÊ ÚÇã 1995

www.alsbah.net
ÚíÔ ÇáÎÈÑ ÃíäãÇ ßäÊ
ÌÑíÏÉ ßá ÇáÝáÓØíäííä
ÝáÓØíäíÉ ÇáÚãÞ : ÚÑÈíÉ ÇáÈÚÏ : ÚÇáãíÉ ÇáÊæÌå
https://www.s-palestine.net/ar/thumbgen.php?im=../images_lib/images/1_1564988074_5367.jpg&w=690
ÇáãÏíÑ ÇáÚÇã ÑÆíÓ ÇáÊÍÑíÑ
ÓÑí ÇáÞÏæÉ

PHP-Nuke Copyright © 2007 by Francisco Burzi. This is free software, and you may redistribute it under the GPL. PHP-Nuke comes with absolutely no warranty, for details, see the license.
: 3.58